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Sport is the field par excellence in which discrimination
against intersex people has been made most visible.
Commissioner for Human Rights, Council of Europe
Issue Paper: Human rights and intersex people (2015)
Olympic and world champion athlete Caster Semenya is asking the European Court
of Human Rights (ECtHR) to make sure all women athletes are “allowed to run free,
for once and for all”. Semenya brings her application against Switzerland, which has
allowed a private sport association and a private sport court to decide – with only
the most minimal appellate review by a national judicial authority – what it takes for
women, legally and socially identified as such all their lives, to count as women in the
context of athletics. I consider how Semenya’s application might bring human rights,
sex, and sport into conversation in ways not yet seen in a judicial forum.
Background
Semenya, a South African national, competes in the sport of track and field, which
is governed internationally by a private association, World Athletics, headquartered
in Monaco. A few years ago, World Athletics introduced new Regulations barring
women with innate variations of sex characteristics from competing in certain
women’s events, unless they medically reduce their atypically high testosterone
levels. Semenya first challenged the Regulations before the Court of Arbitration for
Sport (CAS) – an international arbitral tribunal located in Switzerland and commonly
known as the “supreme court of sport”. After the majority of the CAS panel upheld
the Regulations, Semenya appealed to Switzerland’s highest judicial authority, the
Swiss Federal Tribunal (SFT), which dismissed her claim, leaving the Regulations –
and “sport sex” – in place.
All the while, the UN Human Rights Council‘s independent experts and the UN
High Commissioner for Human Rights, along with Human Rights Watch, the World
Medical Association, and various organizations focused on women’s and LGBTQI+
equality in sport, have expressed serious concern that the Regulations contravene
international human rights norms and standards. However, no court has squarely
decided this question. The CAS panel measured the Regulations against the
non-discrimination provisions of the World Athletics Constitution and the Olympic
Charter (para. 424), finding it unnecessary to delve into the “detailed principles”
of “international human rights law including those that apply in Monaco … and the
domestic laws of many countries in which [World Athletics] has members and holds
international competitions” (para. 544). Whether the Regulations were contrary
to such laws was deemed a matter for the courts of those jurisdictions to decide
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(para. 555). But because the CAS decision is an international arbitral award, the
SFT was restricted, pursuant to the Federal Statute on Private International Law,
to reviewing only one substantive ground of appeal: whether the CAS decision was
compatible with Swiss public policy (i.e. the most fundamental values that, according
to prevailing opinions in Switzerland, should form the basis of any legal order). As
the SFT explained, while the principles underpinning the Swiss Constitution or the
European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR) could be considered when defining
public policy, the provisions of these instruments could not be directly invoked to
challenge the CAS decision (paras. 9.1 to 9.2).
The ECtHR’s consideration of Semenya’s application will therefore mark the first
time a court evaluates the private regulations of World Athletics (and, particularly,
the role of Switzerland in upholding them) against international human rights law. It
may also mark the first time the ECtHR decides a case of discrimination based on
sex characteristics. Given such novelty, what else might be new and different before
the ECtHR compared to the past (quasi)judicial processes? I consider this question
in two (intricately connected) parts – the facts and the law – where the ECtHR could
play a remedial role.
The Facts: Sex before the ECtHR
The CAS panel characterized the case as one of “significant scientific complexity”
and remarked on both the lack of consensus among experts and the “paucity of
evidence” regarding certain matters concerning the effect of testosterone on the
athletic performance (para. 582). The majority of the panel found, however, that the
totality of the evidence provided adequate support for World Athletics’ claim that the
women targeted by the Regulations “enjoy a significant performance advantage over
other female athletes, which is of such magnitude as to be capable of subverting fair
competition within the female category” (para. 538). This finding was also central to
decision of the SFT, which was bound to rule based on the facts found by the CAS.
The SFT made clear that, pursuant to its own constitutive law, it could not correct
or supplement the arbitrators’ findings, even if the facts had been established in a
manifestly incorrect manner or in violation of the law (para. 5.2.2).
Meanwhile, abundant scholarly critiques have been registered against World
Athletics’ evidence, ranging from the methodologies used to the conclusions drawn.
Moreover, much of this evidence was produced “in-house” by World Athletics; the
leaders of its own Health and Science Department conducted the main scientific
study relied on to justify the Regulations. Without delving deeper into this apparent
lack of independence, it is notable that the conflated “scientific” and “legislative”
process here is a private one; no Swiss public authority sought evidence to inform or
evaluate the regulatory decision at issue.
To what extent, then, might the ECtHR reassess the evidence? While the Court was
not set up as a court of first or fourth instance – that is, to establish the basic facts of
a case or to re-evaluate the facts established by a domestic court – it does require
parties to substantiate their claims, and is free to assess the admissibility, relevance,
and probative value of the evidence put forth. The Court may request additional
evidence, draw inferences from the absence of evidence, and even engage in fact-
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finding if the evidence is contested or unclear. To resolve uncertainty, the Court may
rely on evidence from external actors, including experts and academics, as well as a
wide variety of third-party interveners.
Considering this range of evidence would reveal that understandings of sex in
athletics cannot be detached from understandings of sex beyond the sports
sphere. Indeed, sport has been shown to be especially effective at disguising and
transmitting socio-scientific ideologies – including those related to testosterone –
as self-evident truth. While there are limits to the ECtHR’s ability to decide complex
socio-scientific questions, it need not accept factual findings made (tenuously) by
the CAS and not by Switzerland. Moreover, it should become clear to the ECtHR
that “science” cannot provide a definitive answer to the question before it; in fact, the
(selective) way science has been deployed by World Athletics is at the very heart of
the alleged human rights violations.
The Law: Sport before the ECtHR
A number of rights guaranteed by the ECHR are pertinent in Semenya’s case.
Most obvious is Article 8, which encompasses the right to personal autonomy and
identity, including physical, psychological, and moral integrity. The “impossible
choices” and documented harms inherent in the Regulations clearly interfere with
this right. In addition, Article 14 requires member States to secure to everyone
within their jurisdiction all Convention rights “without discrimination on any ground”.
The Regulations apply only to women with certain sex characteristics (which the
Commissioner for Human Rights has said fall under sex as a prohibited ground of
discrimination) and arguably exhibit racial and regional bias.
Whatever Convention rights are invoked, the ECtHR will have to decide whether any
infringement is legally justifiable. To begin, any potential infringement of Article 8
must be “in accordance with the law” – that is, it must have some basis in domestic
law. However, unlike antidoping rules enacted by public authorities – which the
ECtHR has held meet this test – the Regulations at issue in Semenya’s case are not
part of Swiss law or based on any international treaty. Switzerland will therefore be
in the strange position of defending Regulations enacted by a private association
located in Monaco.
In this regard, Switzerland will have to establish that the Regulations pursue one of
the legitimate aims identified in the ECHR. The ECtHR has previously recognized
“fair play and equality of opportunity” in sport as constituting such an aim. More
critically, however, Switzerland will have to establish that the Regulations are
“necessary in a democratic society” to achieve this aim. In addition to the evidentiary
shortcomings discussed already, it is not clear that the Regulations serve a “pressing
social need” like antidoping “whereabouts” rules do, according to the ECtHR. The
need for the latter was based on abundant State-adduced evidence that doping
harms the physical and mental health of athletes and sets a dangerous example for
youth. The “danger” that Switzerland is seeking (or allowing World Athletics) to avoid
in Semenya’s case is much less apparent. In fact, it is Semenya and other athletes
targeted by the Regulations, as well as the youth that look up to them, that are put
most at risk.
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It therefore cannot be said that the ECtHR has established a blanket principle that
the pursuit of fairness can justify serious infringements of athletes’ rights, as the
SFT implied in its decision (para. 9.8.3.3). Surely mandating medically unnecessary
drug use (or surgery) for certain athletes, as a condition of eligibility for the female
category of competition, is not analogous to prohibiting it (with therapeutic use
exemptions) for all athletes.
In any case, the ECtHR’s practice is to “balance” individual interests and the
interests of the community as a whole. But who makes up the relevant community?
The majority of the CAS panel found, for example, that because of “constraints
on the [its] competence and role” it was neither necessary nor appropriate for it to
consider “the possible wider impact” of the Regulations outside the “segment of
society” governed by World Athletics (para. 589). However, it is not just Semenya’s
athletic career, but her entire life, that is affected by the Regulations. Likewise, it is
not just elite women athletes without intersex traits who comprise the community
with interests at stake (and little evidence has been adduced to characterize
these interests). A much broader community may have an interest in seeing the
unhindered potential of every athlete on display, and the whole of the LGBTQI
+ community may have an interest in avoiding the stigmatization that flows from
mandatory “normalization” procedures in any sphere of life. The fact that sport is
“a massively visible social practice, extensively relayed worldwide” makes it all the
more important which community or communities are counted and valued in the
Court’s assessment.
Finally, the scope of the relevant community will also be important to the ECtHR’s
consideration of whether there is a relevant European consensus, which in turn
informs how great a “margin of appreciation” (i.e. degree of deference) is to be
granted to Switzerland. There may be a common European approach reflected in
the calls of the Commissioner for Human Rights and the Parliamentary Assembly
to end medically unnecessary sex-“normalizing” interventions without free and fully
informed consent. When it comes to sport eligibility rules, though, it could be said
that the common approach is to defer to private international governing bodies like
World Athletics. But any such “consensus by omission” only highlights the structural
failure of States to uphold – proactively, where necessary – human rights in the
context of sport. Indeed, World Athletics’ Regulations prevent any consensus (or
lack thereof) from emerging among States by restricting athletes’ access to domestic
courts. Therefore, Switzerland – as the home of the CAS – and the SFT – as the
judicial authority with exclusive jurisdiction to review CAS awards – would seem to
have a unique responsibility to secure the human rights of athletes. In other words,
because Switzerland is effectively speaking for a worldwide community, its margin of
appreciation should be very narrow.
When it comes time for the ECtHR to consider the merits of Semenya’s application,
it will have to decide whether the paradoxical concept of “sport sex“, as upheld by
the SFT, can be sustained in accordance with the ECHR. The limitations of the
judicial processes to date point to the potential – if not the promise – of the ECtHR
to (re)consider the full range of facts and to directly apply human rights law within
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athletics. Whatever the ECtHR decides, its decision will have significant implications
far beyond both Switzerland and sport.
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